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Abstract
  The constitutionalization of international law is a topic that is rapidly gaining 
much prominence in the field of international law scholarship. A plethora of recent 
books and articles in prominent legal journals have sought to explore the various 
aspects of this subject. The literature on the topic is growing rapidly and has already 
covered extensive ground.  A particularly noteworthy recent work is the collaborative 
effort of a team of scholars who have contributed scholarly articles that delineate 
the contours of the modern thinking on this subject. The book is entitled Ruling the 
World? Constitutionalism, International Law and Global Governance, edited by Jeffrey 
Dunoff and Joel Trachtman. This paper seeks to offer a brief critique of the articles 
contained in this latest work. It sets out the principal issues relating to international 
constitutionalism, some of which have been acknowledged and sought to be addressed 
by the scholars in this latest work. The paper raises questions regarding both the 
descriptive as well as the normative aspects of the scholarship on the subject. The 
terms“constitution”and“constitutionalism”have a multiplicity of meanings even 
in the domestic sphere. Any attempt to casually utilize these terms in the international 
context inevitably invites lexical and semantic confusion. The processes presently 
afoot in the international sphere have no precedent or parallel either in the domestic 
or international spheres. Thus the use of the term“constitutionalization,” even 
as a heuristic device, exacerbates rather than alleviates the epistemic difficulties. 
Among other things, the paper urges the need to attend to F. A. Hayek’s use of the 
concepts of“taxis,” “cosmos,”and“nomos,”and the legal extension of the idea of
“fallibilism”from pragmatic epistemology, as possibly relevant concepts pertaining 
to this subject. Drawing upon these concepts, this paper urges a cautious and, for the 
time being, an extension of Cass Sunstein’s“incompletely theorized agreement”
regarding the constitutionalization of international law project. 
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The Purposes of the United Nations are:
1. To maintain international peace and security…
2. To develop friendly relations among nations…
3. To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems 
of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character …
4. To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of 
these common ends.1
                                                                  Charter of the United Nations
Ⅰ. Introduction  :
     The constitutionalization of international law is a topic that is rapidly gaining 
much prominence in the field of international law scholarship. The concept itself is not 
a new one. Early attempts to promote the idea can be traced to the pre-Second World 
War era.2
     A plethora of recent books and articles in prominent legal journals have sought to 
explore the various aspects of this complex subject.3 A particularly noteworthy recent 
work is the collaborative effort of a team of scholars who have contributed scholarly 
articles that delineate the contours of the modern thinking on this subject. The book 
is entitled Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance.4 
This recent work follows up on the work of a spate of other books on this subject.5 
1  Article 1, Charter of the United Nations.
2  Herman Mosler, The International Society as a Legal Community, 140 Recueil Des Cours 
1 (1974).
3  See e.g., Towards World Constitutionalism: Issues in the Legal Ordering of the World 
Community (Ronald St. J.MacDonald & Douglas M. Johnston, editors., 2005); Bardo 
Fassbender, Sovereignty and Constitutionalism in International Law, in Sovereignty in 
Transition (Neil Walker editor, 2003), Erika De Wet, The International Constitutional 
Order, 55 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 51 (2006).
4  Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance, Edited 
by Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Joel P. Trachtman (Cambridge University Press, 2009).
5  The more prominent among these are the following: Towards World Constitutionalism: 
Issues in the Legal Ordering of the World Community (Ronald St. J. Macdonald & 
Douglas M. Johnston, editors 2005); Francisco Orrego Vicuna, International Dispute 
Settlement in an Evolving Global Society: Constitutionalization, Accessibility, Privatization 
(2005); Transnational Governance and Constitutionalism (Christian Joerges and Gunther 
Teubner, editors, 2004).
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One scholar has gone to the extent of declaring that “[t]he problem of international 
constitutionalism is the central challenge faced by international philosophers in the 
21st century.6 
     In this paper, I seek to present a brief critique of the essays and papers collected 
in Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance 
with the aim of delineating a conspectus of the issues raised by the international 
constitutionalism project. I will also suggest issues and concepts which, though by no 
means novel, have not been explored in depth in relation to the subject of international 
constitutionalism. 
     For this purpose, this paper has been structured in the following manner. Part 
II presents an overview of the various meanings and understandings commonly 
assigned to the terms“constitution”and“constitutionalism.”Part III presents the 
principal thrust of the scholarly papers collected and published in the work by Dunoff 
and Trachtman mentioned above along with a few personal comments and thoughts 
thereon. Part IV presents an outline of some of the principal issues raised by the 
international constitutionalism project. Finally, Part V presents the conclusion.
Ⅱ.“Constitution”and“Constitutionalism”:
     The terms“constitution”and“constitutionalism”have traditionally been used in 
the domestic context of the nation-state. In the post-Second World War era, the idea of 
constitutionalism has come to be adopted by more and more nation states around the 
world..7 
     A.“Constitution”:
     In its most basic conception, the constitution of a nation-state is its highest law, 
and is designed to serve a myriad functions. The constitution defines the contours of 
its governmental and administrative structure; it adumbrates the scope and bounds 
of the civil, political, and human rights that individuals possess as against the 
governmental authorities; and it sets out the metrics for evaluating the legality and 
6  Philip Allot, The Emerging Universal Legal System, 3 Int’l L.F. 12, 16 (2001) cited in 
Dunoff and Trachtman, supra note 3, at 3.
7  See Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, 83 Va.L.Rev. 771,772 (1997).
24
A Conspectus of the Issues Relating to 
International Constitutionalism (Nitin Datar)
validity of the actions of the government.8 
　　A constitution could either be written or unwritten. The United Kingdom is 
usually described as having an unwritten constitution. It consists of the interplay 
of laws, customs, practices, principles, and institutions whereby the political and 
governmental functions of the state are conducted. Although certain important 
documents such as the Magna Carta enjoy a special privileged status, it is essentially 
embodied in a collection of statutes, beliefs, and institutional practices.9
     Drawing upon the western tradition of natural law, and the English notion of 
fundamental law, constitutionalism in the United States essentially sought to protect 
legal rights by placing fetters on legislative power through positive expression in a 
written constitution. 
     Even in the case of a written constitution such as the U.S. Constitution, scholars 
have argued that the text ratified at the Philadelphia Convention in 1789 along with 
the subsequent amendments are insufficient to provide an understanding of how 
the provisions of the Constitution actually come to be implemented in practice. And 
therefore, it has been argued, the U.S. Constitution should be deemed to subsume 
momentous judicial precedents, political practices that have been consistently followed 
for a long time, together with“fundamental documents such as the Declaration of 
Independence and the Gettysburg Address and, beyond that, aspects of the American 
experience that cannot be reduced to a text at all.”10
     Jack Balkin has urged his belief that apart from its basic functions, a constitution 
must also epitomize the values and aspirations of the people of a nation, and be 
something that they can identify with.11 The written and unwritten subject matter 
that collectively make up the constitution are the subject matter of contending and 
8  See Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 Yale L.J. 408, 411-
412 (2007).
9  See generally: Colin Turpin and Adam Tomkins, British Government and the 
Constitution: Text and Materials (Cambridge University Press, 2007); But also see: 
David Jenkins, From Unwritten to Written: Transformation in the British Common-Law 
Constitution, 36 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 863.  
10 Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Faith 185 (1988).
11 Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, Constitutional 
Commentary, Vol.24, 427, 461-466.
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often contentious theories of constitutional interpretation that seek to shape the 
understanding of prevailing constitutional practices.12
　　
     B. “Constitututionalism”:
     Constitutionalism is the systematization of thinking about constitutions and 
provides the conceptual framework for evaluating the indicia of governmental 
legitimacy.13 A constitutions is different from the concept of constitutionalism which 
is a means for evaluating the form, substance and legitimacy of the constitution of a 
nation.14 Constitutionalism is deemed to perform a plethora of functions.  It is used as 
a system of classification for the purpose of defining the characteristics of constitutions 
(meaning thereby those documents organizing political power within an institutional 
12 Jack M. Balkin, id., at 516-517. For an early example of“originalist”interpretation, 
see Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment incorporate the Bill of Rights? The 
Original Understanding, 2 Stanford Law Review 5 (1949); for a view canvassing the 
framers’ original intentions, see Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary (Harvard 
University Press 1977); for a view canvassing the ratifiers’original understanding, 
see Richard Fallon, Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional Meaning, 119 
Harvard Law Review 1274, 1317 (1996); for a view urging the original meaning of 
the constitution, see Antonin Scalia, Common Law Courts in a Civil Law System: The 
Role of the United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A 
Matter of Interpretation (Amy Gutmann, ed. 1998); for a view urging the“original 
public meaning,”see Gary Lawson, Proving the Law, 86 Nw.U.L.Rev. 859, 875 
(1992); and S.G.Calabresi, The President's Power to Execute the Laws, 104 Yale L.J. 
541, 553 (1994); for the theory of“original objective-public meaning textualism,”
see Gary Lawson and Guy Seidman, When Did the Constitution Become Law? 77 
Notre Dame L.Rev.1 (2001); for“common law originalism”see Bernadette Meyler, 
Towards a Common Law Originalism, 59 Stan.L.Rev. 551; for the theory of“text 
and principle” see Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 
Constitutional Commentary, Volume 24 (2007); for“living constitutionalism”see 
Bruce Ackerman, Our Living Constitution, 120 Harv.L.Rev. 1737 (2007); for traditional 
considerations such as stare decisis, see S. M. Griffin, American Constitutionalism: 
From Theory to Politics (1996); for the theory of“constitutional moments”see 
Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations (Harvard University Press 1991) and 
We the People: Transformations (Harvard University Press 1998); for the theory of
“partisan entrenchment,”see Jack M. Balkin and Sanford Levinson, Understanding 
the Constitutional Revolution, 87 Va.L.Rev. 1045, 1066 (2001); for the theory of the 
constitution as an institution, see Karl Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 
34 Colum.L.Rev. 1 (1934); for the theory of“constitutional construction,”see Keith 
E. Whittington, Constitutional Construction: Divided Powers and Constitutional Meaning 
(1999); for the“institutional theory of constitutional change,”see S. M. Griffin, 
Constitutional Theory Transformed, 108 Yale L.J. 2115 (1999).
13 For a comprehensive account, see Larry Alexander, editor, Constitutionalism 
(Cambridge University Press, 1998).
14 Karl Loewenstein, Political Power and the Government Process 147 (1957).
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apparatus). It also serves the functions of determining the legitimacy of a constitutional 
system as conceived or as implemented on the footing that the rule of law is the basis 
of legitimate government. It seeks to place limits on government powers so as to 
restrain it from lapsing into arbitrary uses of those powers.15
　　A definitive historical account of the development of constitutionalism is set out in 
Constitutionalism: Ancient and Modern by Charles Howard McIlwain.16 McIlwain traces 
the evolution of the conception of a constitution from the older traditional view to the 
relatively modern understanding of the term. 
     In the traditional view, the term“constitution”referred to“the substantive principles 
to be deduced from a nation’s actual institutions and their development.”17 McIlwain 
quotes the following passage by Lord Bolingbroke as representative of the older view:
     By constitution we mean, whenever we speak with propriety and 
     exactness, that assemblage of laws, institutions and customs, derived
     from certain fixed principles of reason, directed to certain fixed
     objects of public good, that compose the general system, according to
     which the community hath agreed to be governed …. We call this a 
     good government, when … the whole administration of public affairs
     is wisely pursued, and with a strict conformity to the principles and 
     objects of the constitution.18
     On the other hand, in the modern view, a constitution is a self-conscious and 
deliberate act by the people forming the demos of a nation. McIlwain quotes Thomas 
Paine as representing the modern view that“[a] constitution is not the act of a 
government, but of a people constituting a government, and a government without 
a constitution is power without right.”And also that“[a] constitution is a thing 
antecedent to a government; and a government is only the creature of a constitution.”19
15 Ronald St. John Macdonald & Douglas M. Johnston editors, Towards World 
Constitutionalism: Issues in the Legal Ordering of the World Community 31 (2005).
16 Charles Howard McIlwain, Constitutionalism: Ancient and Modern (Liberty Fund, Inc. 
1975) (First Published by Cornell University Press in 1940).
17 McIlwain, Id. at 2.
18 McIlwain id at 2-3, quoting Lord Bolingbroke, A Dissertation upon Parties (1733-34) 
in The Works of Lord Bolingbroke (1841), II, p.88.
19 McIlwain id. at 2, quoting Thomas Paine, Rights of Man, in The Complete Works of 
Thomas Paine (London), at 302-3, 370.
27BULLETIN OF KYUSHU WOMEN'S UNIVERSITY     Vol.47 No.1
     Neil Walker has pithily set out some of the most widely held conceptions of 
constitutionalism (albeit in the specific context of the European Union).20 He terms 
these as“constitutional scepticism,”“constitutional historical-contextualism,” 
“constitutional serialism,”and“constitutional processualism.”In addition he 
discusses a form of transformative constitutionalism flowing from Bruce Ackerman’
s theory of“constitutional moments.”Herewith is a brief explanation of Walker’s 
account of these conceptions:
     (i) Constitutional Scepticism:21
     Constitutional skeptics maintain that the regulatory structures that establish and 
maintain social and political order are embedded in processes and practices established 
at a micro level. To them, state-designed documents and institutions expressly 
designed to be constitutional have little actual efficacy in the regulation of the social 
and political community.
     (ii) Constitutional Historical-Contextualism:22
     In this view, constitutionalism is self-constitutive inasmuch as constitutional 
discourse together with practices and institutions designated as constitutional are ipso 
facto indicia of a constitutional order.
     (iii) Constitutional Serialism:23 
     This view conceptualizes constitutionalism as a step-by-step progression of events 
leading to the fulfillment of the constitutionalist agenda.
     (iv) Constitutional Processualism:24
     This view, which could also be described as constitutional functionalism, believes 
20 Neil Walker, After the Constitutional Moment, The Federal Trust Constitutional Online 
Paper Series No. 32/03. Available at SSRN: or doi: 102139/ssrn.516783. Although 
Walker’s article relates to the development of constitutionalism in the context of 
the European Union, his exposition provides a useful overview of concepts that are 
relevant in other contexts as well. 
21 Neil Walker, id., at 4. Walker cites K.H.Ladeur, Towards a Legal Theory of 
Supranationality ? The Viability of the Network Concept, 37 European Law Journal 3 
(1997); and Neil Walker, The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism, 65 Modern Law Review 
(2002).
22 Id. at 4.
23 Id. at 5.
24 Id. at 5.
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that the real indicia of constitutionalism lie in the processes and practices relating to 
the structures of the political order rather than in  large events which usually generate 
publicity and attract attention.
     (v) Transformative Constitutionalism:25
     This view is based upon Bruce Ackerman’s thesis of“constitutional moments” 
in the context of American Constitutional history.26 In Ackerman’s formulation, 
“constitutional moments”are transformative periods of“higher lawmaking”when 
the people rise above mundane quotidian concerns and think about more lofty ideals. 
This results in popular sovereignty expressing itself in social and political movements 
that lead to constitutional change and development.   
     However, differences about the minutiae and details about the import of the term 
“constitutionalism”and the means for understanding it can be found aplenty in 
contemporary constitutional discourse. By way of example, four such differences can 
be found in the collected volume of papers edited by Dunoff and Trachtman.27
     Dunoff and Trachtman seek to frame the understanding of the term 
constitutionalism through the lens of seven mechanisms that they identify as:“(1) 
horizontal allocation of authority, (2) vertical allocation of authority, (3) supremacy, (4) 
stability, (5) fundamental rights, (6) review, and (7) accountability.”28
     Mattias Kumm argues that the essence of constitutionalism is a“constitutional 
cognitive frame,”which consists of four requirements: (1) it must allow for an all-
embracing structure for legitimation of public authority, (2) it should be foundational, 
(3) it must be conducive of the ideas of human freedom and equality, and (4) it 
must provide a mechanism for discourse regarding (i) constraints on public authority 
through law, (ii) procedural legitimacy, and (iii) restraints on encroachment on human 
and constitutional rights.29
25 Id. at 3-4.
26 Ackerman has propounded his thesis in: Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations 
(Harvard University Press,1991); and Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Transformations 
(Harvard University Press, 1998).
27 Supra note 3.
28 Dunoff and Trachtman, in Dunoff and Trachtman, supra note 4, at 10. Also at 19 to 
21.
29 Mattias Kumm, in Dunoff and Trachtman, id. at 323 to 325.
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     Daniel Halberstam identifies the fundamental values of constitutionalism as“voice, 
expertise, and rights.”He uses these to refer to the right to participate in governance, 
individual rights, and legitimacy of the governing authorities based on governing 
capability.30 
     Transnational constitutionalism builds upon the idea of constitutionalism on an 
international scale. Transnational constitutionalism seeks to foster the development of 
institutionalized organizations among the community of nations which are independent 
of and larger than the sum of their members. Prominent examples of such transnational 
constitutionalism are the institution of the United Nations Organization, the World 
Trade Organization, and the European Union.31 The European Union has been 
described as a federalist system that has its basis in international law, but has been 
constitutionalized through the acts of the very institutions that have been constitutive 
in its making, and that has been acquiesced to by the various Member States.32         
     Cottier has urged that for effective governance on an international scale, it is 
necessary that there be“an attitude and a framework capable of reasonably balancing 
and weighing different, equally legitimate and democratically defined basic values and 
policy goals of a polity dedicated to promote liberty and welfare in a broad sense.”33
        And as Neil Walker has stated: 
          Institutional design, even in the most venerable and venerated
          constitutional settlements, must always be viewed as a derivative 
          and contingent exercise, always at the service of the core values 
          and the changing detail of material and cultural conditions and
          of diversely located solutions which influence the articulation and
          optimal balance of these core values.34 
30 Daniel Halberstam, in Dunoff and Trachtman, id. at 338 to 353.
31 See generally: Bardo Fassbender, The United Nations Charter as the Constitution of the 
International Community, 36 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 529(1998): and 
Erika De Wet, The International Constitutional Order, 55 International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly 51(2006). 
32 Bruno Simma and Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law: Jus Cogens and 
General Principles, 12 Australian Yearbook of International Law 81 (1992).
33 Thomas Cottier, Limits to International Trade: The Constitutional Challenge, 94 American 
Society of International Law Proceedings 220,221 (2000).
34 Neil Walker, Postnational Constitutionalism and the Problem of Translation, in European 
Constitutionalism Beyond the State 27,54 (H.H.Weiler and Marlene Wind editors, 
Cambridge University Press 2003).
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     Transnational regulatory networks refer to arrangements whereby governmental 
authorities in one nation cooperate directly with their counterparts in other nations 
to effectively govern matters within their jurisdiction and zone of expertise. They 
do so without a central governing authority. One example is the Organization of 
Securities Commission which deals with international securities transactions. The 
functional arrangement of a  Transnational Regulatory Network could be viewed as 
an unconstitutionalized regime set up to perform specified regulatory tasks.  Such 
Transnational Regulatory Networks serve the useful purpose of tackling issues where 
states have common interests. Their effectiveness is, however, hampered by legal 
and political constraints that regulators are confronted with in the implementation of 
rules.35 
Ⅲ. A Brief Overview of Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International Law, 
and Global Governance:
     The opening paper by Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Joel P. Trachtman is entitled“A 
Functionalist Approach to International Constitutionalization.”36 The paper sets 
out the scope and purpose of the entire book. To them, this is to“examine the 
conceptual coherence and normative desirability of constitutional orders beyond 
the state and explore what is at stake in debates over global constitutionalism.”37 
They seek to circumvent the problem of definition inevitably raised by international 
constitutionalism by seeking to highlight instead the functions that international 
constitutional norms perform. To them, these are: the fostering of the creation of 
new rules of international law, which they term“enabling constitutionalization”; 
the inhibition of the creation of new rules of international law, which they term 
“constraining constitutionalization”; and the filling up of lacunae in domestic 
international law, which they term“supplemental constitutionalization.”They then 
relate these to the conventional modes through which constitutional law is designed 
to fulfill its functions. Although deep and well-textured, the analysis offered by Dunoff 
35 Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Transnational Regulatory Networks and Their Limits, 34 Yale 
Journal of International Law 1(2009); Also see: J. Braithwaite & P. Drahos, Global 
Business Regulation (Cambridge University Press, 2000).
36 Dunoff and Trachtman, supra note 4, Chapter 1, pages 3 to 35.
37 Id., at 3.
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and Trachtman appears to end up as an elaborate new way to define international 
constitutionalism. Thereby it gets entangled in the definitional problem which they 
seek to avoid. 
     In“The Mystery of Global Governance,”38 David Kennedy offers a balanced 
and restrained view of the international constitution project. He recognizes it as a 
normative as well as descriptive exercise. He situates it among attempts being made 
by proponents of other disciplines to offer their own weltanschauung of contemporary 
structures of international power and influence, as well as earlier attempts by scholars 
of international law to describe the structuring of the international rule of law. 
     In“The International Legal System as a Constitution,”39 Andreas L. Paulus 
starts from the premise that the recent fragmentation of international law leads to a 
refutation of the argument that international constitutionalization flows inevitably from 
the growth of international institutions. He then offers ways in which it might become 
possible to read constitutionalism into areas of international law, because, to him, that 
would foster the rule of law internationally as opposed to a rule of crude power. 
     In“The UN Charter - A Global Constitution?”40 Michael W. Doyle attempts 
to answer the question whether the UN Charter could properly be described as a 
constitution of the world. He views the Charter as being less than a constitution when 
compared to the U.S.Constitution, but something more than a typical multistate treaty. 
He briefly sketched the self-interested contestation and realpolitik that is played out in 
the working of the Charter.
     In“Rediscovering a Forgotten Constitution: Notes on the Place of the UN 
Charter in the International Legal Order”41 Bardo Fassbender too evaluates the UN 
Charter in constitutional terms. He argues that the concept of constitutional law in 
the international context should be interpreted as having an autonomous sense, and 
aspirationally believes that treating the Charter in constitutional terms could be the 
means of realizing the high ideals embodied therein.
     In“Reframing EU Constitutionalism,”42 Neil Walker examines the European 
38 Id., Chapter 2, at pages 37 to 68.
39 Id., Chapter 3, at pages 69 to 109.  
40 Id., Chapter 4, at pages 113 to 132.
41 Id., Chapter 5, at pages 133 to 147.
42 Id., Chapter 6, at pages 149 to 176.
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Council’s abortive attempt to get a constitutional treaty ratified for the European 
Union. He recognizes the descriptive and normative dimensions of constitutionalism 
and offers five frames through which the constitutional idea can be seen, and raises 
further questions about the constitutional project in Europe. 
     In“The Politics of International Constitutions: The Curious Case of the World 
Trade Organization,”43 Jeffrey L. Dunoff uses the“enabling,”“constraining,”and 
“supplemental”constitutionalization lens to examine the constitutional functions 
of the WTO’s constitution, and suggests that it is barely constitutionalized. He then 
ruminates about the reasons why constitutional discourse has come to occupy such an 
important place in WTO scholarship.
     In“Constitutional Economics of the World Trade Organization,”44 Joel P. 
Trachtman uses the tools of constitutional economics to examine the nature of 
constitutionalization and comes to the conclusion that the WTO constitution does have 
constitutional features.
     In“Human Rights and International Constitutionalism,”45 Stephen Gardbaum 
compares the systems of constitutional law and international human rights law and 
concludes that notwithstanding issues such as state consent, a case could be made 
that certain aspects of international human rights law could be termed as quasi-
constitutional. 
     Mattias Kumm offers a radical redescription of the conceptual framework of 
constitutionalization in "The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: On the 
Relationship between Constitutionalism in and beyond the State.”46 Under his proposed
“cosmopolitan paradigm”it would be possible to evaluate claims to constitutionalism 
in both the domestic and international contexts notwithstanding the inherent structural 
differences. He urges the adoption of the cognitive frame provided by his cosmopolitan 
paradigm as opposed to the traditional statist paradigm to understand better present 
constitutional practices and also as a mean to shape the development of future 
practices.
     In“Constitutional Heterarchy: The Centrality of Conflict in the European Union 
43 Id., Chapter 7, at pages 178 to 205.
44 Id., Chapter 8, at pages 206 to 229.
45 Id., Chapter 9, at pages 233 to 257.
46 Id., Chapter 10, at pages 258 to 324.
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and the United States,”47 Daniel Halberstam notes the legal pluralism inherent in the 
European legal system and  makes the claim that“heterarchy”or a non-hierarchy is 
a basic condition of the systems of governance in the United States and the European 
Union. This causes conflict which in turn, leads to a system of order based on mutual 
compromise among the various parties involved regarding the values of representation, 
rights, and governing expertise.
     In“Courts and Pluralism: Essay on a Theory of Judicial Adjudication in the 
Context of Legal and Constitutional Pluralism,”48 Miguel P. Maduro examines the effect 
of legal and constitutional pluralism on judicial interpretation and adjudication.
     Finally, in“Whose Constitution(s)? International Law, Constitutionalism, and 
Democracy,”49 Samantha Besson argues for an exploration of the connection between 
democracy and constitutionalism as an essential prerequisite to a clearer understanding 
of constitutionalism in the international context. 
Ⅳ. An Overview of the Issues Relating to International Constitutionalization:
     The constitutionalization of international law is no straightforward matter. It 
raises a host of complex issues. U.S. Supreme Court Justice John Marshall famously 
urged in McCulloch v. Maryland to“never forget that it is a constitution that we are 
expounding.”50 Although it may seem unusual for this statement to be invoked in 
reference to international constitutionalism in the twenty-first century, it nevertheless 
encapsulates an essential element of the difficulty raised by the international 
constitutionalization project. 
     In a recent law review article, Anne Peters has identified the epistemic, 
descriptive and normative arguments that have been raised to date against the 
constitutionalization of international law.51 The principal arguments are:
47 Id., Chapter 11, at pages 326 to 355.
48 Id., Chapter 12, at pages 356 to 379.
49 Id., Chapter 13, at pages 381 to 407.
50 Justice John Marshall, McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheaton) 316,407 (1819). 
51 Anne Peters, The Merits of Global Constitutionalism, 16 Indiana Journal of Global 
Legal Studies 397-411 (2009).
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i. The use of the term“constitutionalism”fosters unrealistic expectations.52
ii.“Constitutionalism”is a chimerical concept that invests global governance 
with unjustified legitimacy.53
iii. Talk about“constitutionalism”of international law is overblown in academic 
circles, and there appears to be no manifest trend in that direction on the political 
plane.54
iv.“Constitutionalization”on the international plane has a Eurocentric and 
Western bias that militates against legal pluralism and tends to deny the legitimacy of 
legal approaches that stem from other cultural and historical traditions.55
Following are some other problems and issues associated with the international 
constitutionalization project. Some of these have been recognized and sought to be 
answered by the authors of the useful volume under discussion though not quite 
satisfactorily. Some of them have not been noted at all. 
     To begin with, the most important issue is the definitional problem. It is evident 
that many of the authors in the volume under discussion and other authors who 
have tackled the subject are using the terms“constitution”and“constitutionalism” 
in varying senses. This is understandable inasmuch as, these terms are sometimes 
interpreted in various ways even in the domestic context. The problem is considerably 
compounded when a term that has been hitherto used principally with reference to 
a political structure or arrangement in a domestic context is sought to be used with 
reference to a structure or arrangement in the international sphere. 
     The problem of state consent and the absence of a clear machinery for the 
enforcement of rules and norms in the domain of international law have no parallel 
in the domestic domain. Although international law theorists such as the proponents 
of the New Haven School of international law have demonstrated the effectiveness 
52 Anne Peters, id. at 400, citing Ronald St.John Macdonald and Douglas M. Johnston, 
Introduction to Towards World Constitutionalism: Issues in the Legal Ordering of the World 
Community, at xiii, xvii (Ronald St. John MacDonald & Douglas M. Johnston, editors, 
2005).
53 Anne Peters, id. citing Deborah Z. Cass, Constitutionalization of the WTO 8, 237 (2005).
54 Anne Peters, id. at 401, citing Klaus Armingeon and Karolina Milewicz Compensatory 
Constitutionalisation: A Comparative Perspective, 22 Global Society 179 (2008).
55 Anne Peters, id. at 404, citing Carol Harlow, Global Administrative Law: The Quest for 
Principles and Values, 17 European Journal of International Law 187, 189 (2006).
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of the enforcement of international rules and norms even in the absence of a defined 
implementation mechanism, the situation is nevertheless completely different. The 
constitutionalization of law in such a setting cannot but be fundamentally different 
from the traditional understanding of the term in the domestic setting. 
     This only leads to a confusion about what precisely is being sought to be done. 
Nor is it clear what purpose is sought to be achieved by using terms with a core 
of settled understandings, albeit unsettled at the margins, and using them in non-
cognate contexts. It is no use simply saying that the terms“constitution”and 
“constitutionalism”as used in the international context are not intended to mean 
what they mean in the domestic context. Nor is it helpful, as Mattias Kumm has, with 
considerably ingenuity done, to reframe the terms to make them expansive enough 
to accommodate their use in both the domestic and international context. Until these 
redefined terms reach a critical mass of acceptance, their use will continue to meet 
with confusion and repudiation. The frame of reference will continue to be bounded 
by the circumference of the conventional understanding. What is being mooted is a 
new conceptual framework. Would it not be more useful then to coin a neologism to 
describe this new idea?56
     Dunoff acknowledges a time of“deep disciplinary anxiety”among theorists of 
international law.57  Serious questions are once again being raised about the“realism” 
of international law by rational choice theorists such as Jack Goldsmith and Eric 
Posner.58 They have, for example, offered an interpretation of customary international 
law which raises questions whether state compliance with CIL is based on legal or 
56 Jack Goldsmith and Daryl Levinson have also chalked out the areas of commonality 
shared by international law and constitutional law and made a cogent argument to 
support the thesis that it would be more useful to view the two as belonging to the 
same conceptual category, namely“public law.”See: Jack Goldsmith and Daryl 
Levinson, Law for States: International Law, Constitutional Law, Public Law, 122 Harvard 
Law Review 1791 (2009).
57 Dunoff, supra note 43, at 204. 
58 See Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, The Limits of International Law (Oxford 
University Press, 2005). For a criticism of this book, see: Oona Hathaway and Ariel 
N. Lavinbuk, Rationalism and Revisionism in International Law, review of Posner and 
Goldsmith, in 119 Harvard Law Review 1404 (2006).
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moral obligation.59 It would be cynical to assume that it is this anxiety that is driving 
international law theorists to appropriate the cachet of constitutionalism. However, the 
coinage of a new term would direct the discussion from the appropriate labeling to the 
substantial core of the project. 
     Halberstam raises an interesting point when he states that it is possible to“find 
constitutional order in spontaneous, mutual accommodation”in areas of governance 
at the international level.60 The concept of“spontaneous order”and the cognate 
concept of“emergence”is widely associated with the writings of Nobel Prize winning 
economist F.A.Hayek, who was also trained in law. It refers to the spontaneous 
occurrence of order in a chaotic situation. Although the concept itself is of ancient 
origin dating back to the Pre-Socratics and can be seen in the writings of John Stuart 
Mill, Julian Huxley and others in areas as diverse as economics and biology, F.A.Hayek 
was the first to use the concept in connection with the subject of law. Along with 
his writings on economics for which he is most well-known, Hayek also sought to 
expatiate on the subject of the rule of law.61 Hayek considered constitutionalism to be 
the“American contribution to the rule of law.”62 F.A. Hayek propounded his theory of
“emergence”and“spontaneous order”in his well-known work, Law, Legislation and 
Liberty.63. The core of Hayek’s thesis is set out at length in Volume 1 entitled Rules 
and Order.64 Hayek distinguishes between two types of order: One is an exogenous 
order that has been brought about by forces extraneous to a system, whereas another 
59 See: Jack L.Goldsmith III and Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International 
Law, University of Chicago Law Review, Fall 1999. For Goldsmith and Posner’
s reply to their critics, see Eric A.Posner and Jack L.Goldsmith III, The New 
International Law Scholarship, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=901991. 
Posner and Goldsmith commend the fact“that a new kind of international law 
scholarship is emerging, one that relies on more heavily on social scientific attitudes 
and methodologies than the international law scholarship that it is gradually 
displacing.”
60 Daniel Halberstam in Dunoff and Trachtman, supra note 4, at 355.
61 See F.A. Hayek, Constitution of Liberty (1960).
62 Gerhard Casper, Constitutionalism, in Encyclopedia of the American Constitution, Volume 
2, at 633 (Leonard W. Levy and Kenneth L. Karst, editors, Macmillan Reference, 
2000).
63 F.A.Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty (The University of Chicago, 1973).
64 F.A. Hayek, id., Volume 1 Rules and Order (The University of Chicago, 1973). See 
particularly Chapter 2 Cosmos and Taxis, Chapter 4 The Changing Concept of Law, 
Chapter 5 Nomos: The Law of Liberty, and Chapter 6 Thesis: The Law of Legislation.
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is an endogenous order that has been brought about by forces internal to the system. 
Hayek refers to the exogenously created order as a“made”order or“taxis”and to 
the endogenously created order as a“spontaneous” order or“cosmos.”Spontaneous 
orders are the end result of a process of evolution and not of any deliberate intention. 
Such spontaneous orders are the result of the components within the system reflexively 
abiding by certain norms to comport with their environment. According to Hayek, the 
most durable and enduring social structures including the laws ordering society and 
social relations, or“nomos”are emergent and a manifestation of a spontaneous order. 
     Hayek’s thesis has its critics, and in its extreme form is difficult to accept in respect 
of vast areas of the law. One prominent critic is Judge Richard Posner who disagrees 
with Hayek’s view of the common law as a manifestation of a spontaneous order and 
of his view that the purpose of law is to maintain order. As a votary of the law and 
economics movement, Judge Posner places primacy on wealth maximization.65
     Nevertheless Halberstam’s reference to a spontaneous order carries with it an 
implicit note of caution which is welcome. Constitutionalism has both a descriptive 
as well as prescriptive dimension. The descriptive project is, whether well-founded or 
otherwise, a mostly academic exercise. However, the prescriptive project, if undertaken 
hastily without due consideration of the complex issues involved, could have 
unintended consequences.66
     Hayek’s thesis about the growth and nature of law also finds an echo in the idea 
of“legal fallibilism,”an extension of an idea from pragmatic epistemology, that 
was espoused by Justice Holmes of the United States Supreme Court.67 As described 
by Kellogg, this entailed viewing the law as“the development of a consensual 
understanding, expressed in rules and principles,”and the legal process as“an 
extended intergenerational process of inquiry”with the aim of creating order among 
65 See Richard Posner, Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy (2003) (especially chapter 7).
66 In their paper entitled Choice, Emergence, and Constitutional Process: A Framework 
for Positive Analysis, Petrick Runst and Richard E.Wagner have presented the view 
that“constitutions are subject to spontaneous ordering just as ordinary market 
processes.”Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1608235.
67 Frederic R. Kellogg, Legal Fallibilism: Law (like Science) as a Form of Community 
Inquiry. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1484623.
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social relations.68 Justice Holmes’s“legal fallibilism”also carries with it an implicit 
word of caution against an overly eager prescriptive constitutionalist project in the 
international sphere. 
     Another issue that is relevant to this subject is the consequences of the 
internationalization of constitutional law upon the constitutionalization of international 
law. In recent years, one marked developments in international has been the 
transnational convergence of norms of international law through the“transnational 
legal process.”Harold Hongju Koh of Yale Law School describes this as a means
          whereby an international law rule is interpreted through the interaction
          of transnational actors in a variety of law-declaring fora, then internalized
          into a nation’s domestic legal system. Through this three-part process of 
          interaction, interpretation, and internalization, international rules
          become integrated into national law and assume the status of 
          internally binding domestic legal obligations.69
     Due to a growing consensus among most nations regarding what constitutes good 
and effective government, constitutions are growing to be increasingly similar in 
various respects.70 When the nations of the world have similar constitutions, there is 
likely to be a growing centripetalism regarding core understandings. This in turn could 
lead to fewer disagreements among the nations when they seek to form associations 
at the international level. Due to this growing cohesion in opinions on a multiplicity 
of issues, there is likely to be less of a need for constitutionalism at the international 
level. Equally, when the situation requires that a regime be constitutionalized, there is 
likely to be less difficulty in bringing  this about.71
Ⅴ. Conclusion:
     The surge in scholarship relating to international constitutionalism is a marked 
recent development in the field of international law. It undoubtedly opens up exciting 
68 Kellogg, id., at 1.
69 Harold Hongju Koh, Bringing International Law Home, 35 Houston Law Rev. 623, 
625-626 (1998) (internal citations omitted).
70 M. Shaw, Theory of the Global State (Cambridge University Press 2001).
71 Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 287 (Oxford University Press, 
2003).
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lines of intellectual inquiry. The descriptive aspect of this intellectual exercise could 
be useful academically. The work that is presently being done will no doubt be 
reworked and refined as time goes by. It would be helpful to proceed with caution. 
Cass Sunstein’s espousal of “incompletely theorized agreements” could be a useful 
pointer to guide present theoretical development of the subject.72 Sunstein has argued 
that in the numerous instances where people agree about constitutional practices but 
are unable to agree about the theories undergirding those practices, the interests of 
a harmonious polity require that there be an“incompletely theorized agreement”
about those practices. It would be sensible to extend this principle to the realm of 
international constitutionalism. Let theory follow practice. 
     However, it is the prescriptive aspect of the international constitutionalism project 
which calls for a particular need for caution. As David Kennedy has so eloquently put 
it, we are presently in an era of“great unknowing.”73 Nation-states are learning to 
cope with powerful new forces set in motion by the liberalization of capital markets 
and the reconfigured environment in which economic, political, business, social, and 
cultural interactions are being played out in the international context.74 The present 
era is being widely proclaimed as marking a major shift in the course of world events, 
comparable in scope and moment to the era of industrialization. International economic 
and political arrangements and structures are being altered at a fundamental level. As 
many proponents of international constitutionalism appear to be suggesting, it could 
lead to a situation similar to Bruce Ackerman’s“constitutional moment”leading to
“higher lawmaking”on an international scale. But equally, rather than centripetal 
forces it could propel centrifugal forces which resist the constitutionalization of 
international law. Hence it is necessary to proceed with care and caution in promoting 
the prescriptive aspect of the constitutionalization of international law project. 
72 See: Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements in Constitutional Law, 
available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=957369. This has also been cited with 
seeming approval by Maduro at page 366 of Dunoff and Trachtman. supra note 4.
73 Kennedy, in Dunoff and Trachtman. supra note 4, at 61,64. 
74 See Jagdish Bhagwati, In Defense of Globalization (Oxford University Press, 2007); 
Joseph E. Stiglitz, Making Globalization Work (W.W.Norton & Co., 2006).
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要　約
　国際法の憲法化というトピックは、国際法学の分野で、急速に顕著になりつつある。主
要な法律関係のジャーナルで、非常に多くの最近の文献や論文が、このテーマの様々な面
を突き詰めていこうとしている。このトピックについての文献は急速に増え続け、すでに
大きな規模でカバーされている。特に一筆に値する最近の業績は、このテーマの現代の考
えの輪郭を、正確に記述し学術的記事に貢献している学者たちの1チームの協力的なもので
ある。その本の題名は、『Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International Law and 
Global Governance』であり、Jeffrey DunoffとJoel Trachtman によって編集されてい
る。この論文は、もっとも最近の業績に含まれる記事の短い批判を提供しようとしている。
それは、国際憲法主義に関する主な問題を正確に記述しようとしており、その中のいくつ
かは、この最近の業績の中で、学者によって容認され、説明されようとしている。この論
文では、このテーマにおける学問の記述的で標準的な面の両方に関する疑問を挙げている。
“constitution”と“constitutionalism”という言葉は、国内の分野ですら、多様な意味がある。
国際的な文脈で、これらの言葉を簡単に使おうとすると、語彙的意味の混乱を招くのは避け
られない。国際分野で現在起こりつつあるプロセスは、前例もなく、国内や国際分野どちら
にも、平行するものでない。このように、“constitutionalization”という言葉の使用は、発
見的方法だとしても、知識の難しさを減らすよりも、むしろ悪化させるものである。他にあ
る中でも、この論文では、“taxis”と“cosmos”と“nomos”のF. A. Hayek の使用概念と実用
的な認識論からの“Fallibilism”の考えの法律的延長線が、可能な限りこのテーマに関わりの
ある概念であることを追求する必要性を促している。このような概念の下に、この論文では、
慎重に暫定的で Cass Sunstein の“未完成な理論的同意”で、国際法プロジェクトの憲法化
について述べている。
